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2Michael M. Hutchison* andDavidH.pyle**
There is awidespreadbeliefthatcurrentandexpectedfederal govern-
mentcreditdemands are keeping U.S. real interestrates stubbornlyhigh
andmayslow the speedandlimitthe duration ofthe economic recovery.
To shed light on this debate, this study investigates the link between
budget deficits and real interest rates by "pooling" annual time series
datafor the last decade across the seven major industrial countries. The
results suggest that short-term real interest rates are systematically and
positively associated with central government budget deficits across
countries andacross time.
There is a widespread belief that current and
expected federal government credit demands are
keeping U.S. interest rates stubbornly high and may
slow the speed and limit the duration of the eco-
nomic recovery as it matures. This conventional
wisdom is generally supported by a body ofmacro-
economic theory that posits a strong positive causal
link between government budget deficits (or out-
standing government debt) and real interest rates.
Nevertheless, there are theoretical challenges to
this proposition, and empirical support for it is
sketchy and largely based on indirect evidence de-
rived from simulations of large scale econometric
models. I Little empirical evidence ofa direct link
running from budget deficits to interest rates has
been found. 2 In fact, the conclusion of a recent
study by the U.S. Treasury (1984) was that "...high
deficits have had virtually no relationship with high
interest rates..." during the past two decades. 3
Other recent studies of the U.S. experience (for
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example, Evans, 1983, Motley, 1983, and Hoel-
scher, 1983) also have failed to find a significant
positive link between U.S. budget deficits and in-
terest rates.
Although considerable research has investigated
real interest rate behavior and the relation between
real rates and budget deficits, very little of this
research has focused on countries outside the U.S.
Extending the analysis to other countries could be
useful in several ways. For example, it could pro-
vide information about the robustness ofthe result
found for the U.S. Also, by extending the analysis,
one can conduct joint tests for several countries at
once. This could result in more powerful statistical
tests of the deficit-interest rate link because more
data, that exhibit greater variation, can beexploited.
The latterconsideration motivates the strategy of
this paper. We pool annual time series data across
the seven major industrial countries (the U.S., the
U.K., France, Japan, Italy, Canada and Germany)
to investigate whether budget deficits are signifi-
cantly positively associated with real interest rates..
Pooling observations increases the variability ofthe
data, both over time and across countries, because
ofthe diversity ofexperience with real interest rates
and budget deficits in the seven countries of the
sample.
Using ourpooled data sample, we regress short--
term real interest rates on budget deficits, holding
constant money growth and a cyclical measure ofeconomic actlVlty. The results of our empirical
work suggest that short-term real interest rates are
systematically and positively associated with cen-
tralgovernmentbudgetdeficits across countriesand
across time. Totestthe[obustnessofoursurprising-
ly strong.result, we testfor the budgetdeficitlteal
interest rate association in a variety of ways. The
basic resultdoes not appearparticularly sensitive to
the choiceofgovemrnentdeficitmeasureormoney
growth proxy. However, the budgetdeficit/real in-
terest rate linkage is weakened somewhat when the
cyclical measure (a standardized unemployment
rate) is included as anexplanatory variable.
Onbalance, this research providesempiricalsup-
port for the hypothesized positive linkage between
government budget deficits and real interest rates.
This evidence is consistent with the view that bud-
get deficits lead to highreal rates ofinterest. To the
bestofour knowledge, this is the first international
evidence supporting the hypothesis.
The next sectionprovides an outlineofthe meth~
odology we use to analyze the data. Section II
follows with a descriptionofthedataandtheempir-
ical results from estimating the basic model. Section
III extends the basic model and presents estimates
ofvarious equations designed to test the robustness
ofthe deficit-interest rate relationship found in the
preceding section. The paperconcludes with a brief
summary and some tentative policy implications.
I. Methodology
The purpose of the research reported here is to
test the hypothesis that high short-term real interest
rates (r) are positively associated with high buqget
deficits (B), after controlling for other systematic
influences on the real rate (Z):
The vector of other systematic variables, Z,
should include all variables that are correlated with
short-term real interest rates. We limit Z, however,
to a money growth variable (M), a cyclical variable
-the standardized unemployment rate (U), and
country-specific dummy variables (D).
In searching for the relevant systematic variables
to include in Z, we think of real interest rates as
influencedbythedemand and supplyofcreditin the
economy. As money growth represents a net addi-
tion to the supply ofcredit, it should be negatively
associated with short-term real rates. The net cycli-
cal private demand for credit, in contrast, will vary
with the fluctuations in business activity-roughly
proxied by the unemployment rate variable. The
higher the level ofeconomic activity (the lower the
rate of umployment), the greater is the private de-
mand for credit. However, higher business activity
andincomeare alsogenerallyassociatedwithgreat-
ersaving-increasing the net supply ofcredit. The
net effect ofthe cyclical variable on the short-term
real interest rate depends on which factor dominates:
the increase in private credit demand or private
credit supply associated with expanding economic
activity.
r = feB, Z, JL) (I)
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Thus, although we do not develop a complete
structural model ofreal interest rate determination,
our formulation of Equation (1) is consistent with
both the familiar IS-LM framework and a simple
loanable funds flow model ofthe bond and money
markets. 4 This bodyofmacroeconomic theory pre-
dicts a positive relation between budget deficits and
short-termrealrates anda negativerelationbetween
money growth and short-term real rates. The ex-
pected sign of unemployment is ambiguous, al-
though most models generally predict a negative
correlation with real interest rates.
The dummy variable for eachcountry in the sam-
ple is introduced to take into account some of the
institutional and structural diversity, such as tax
rates, non-homogeneous inflation measures, and
political instability among the industrial countries.
These differences might explain persistent inter-
national discrepancies in real interest rates (beyond
thQse assQciated with money growth, government
budget deficits and cyclical variables). Taking note
of them is important because pooling data has the
major disadvantage of constraining the estimated
coefficients in a modelto be equal acrosscountries.
Introducing dummy variables is an attempt to cap-
ture significant structural differences among coun-
tries in the level of real interest rates. It does not
capture differences in their cyclical behavior. Nev-
ertheless, itallows us to poolthesampleand touse a
greaterdegree ofdiversity in real interest rates and
budgetdeficits than would otherwise be the case.The real interest equation that we have estimated
is:
r'i = bo + b l B'i + b2 M,;
6
+ b1 U'i + 2: b1+; D,; + I-t'i (2) , .. i=l"
where r'i = short-term real interest rate at time t in
country i
B'i government budget deficit (percent of
GNP) at time t in country i
M ti = money growthrate attime t in country i
U'i = unemployment rate at time t in country
1
D ti = 1for country i for all t,
ootherwise
I-t,j = random errorterm
The estimation ofEquation (2) using pooled data
implies that the variation over time and across
countries in short-term real interest rates is not pure-
ly random but is due to structural (D), cyclical (U),
and policy-determined(B andM)differences across
countri~s. In general, estimation on a country by
country basis does not provide enough variation in
th~budg~tdeficits to producepowerfultests oftheir
effec;t.oninterest rates. Forexample, there are. only
three years between 1973-82 in which U.S. budget
deficits were over2.5 percentofGNP. Pooling data
over theseyencountries provides numerous obser-
vationswithdeficits ofthis magnitude orgreater.
To ()btainthe .added statistical power for discern-
ing the effects of deficits, we constrain the policy
and cyclical variables to have comparable effects
across countries and ask, controlling for other vari-
abl~s, does ahigherdeficit generally imply a higher
real interest rate for each country? Our interpreta-
tion ofOLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates of
the coefficient b l in Equation (2) is that it reflects
the correlation ofshort-term real rates with budget
deficits, holding otherrelevant variables constant.
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; OLS regressions
Real Interest Rate Equations: Pooled
Regression for Seven Major Industrial









































The data used in ouranalysis are annual observa-
tions for the seven major industrial countries during
the 1973-82 period. Only the recent decade was
chosen because it represents a significant departure
from the economic environment prevailing during
the greater part ofthe 1950s and 1960s. Specifically,
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System of
fixed exchange rate parities, disruptive oil supply
shocks, rapid inflation and, in many countries, the
largest peacetime government deficits ever experi-
enced, distinguish the last decade from the two
preceding. We believe therefore that the relation
betweenbudgetdeficits and real interest rates found
in the most recent data are likely to have the most
current policy relevance.
Annual data are used because they are less likely
to be distorted by the transitory shocks that domi-
nate short-term changes in some variables, particu-
larly real interest rates. Annual data also appear
preferable because the timing between actual gov-
ernment deficits and Treasury financing may not
correspond very closely during shorter periods.
Financial markets may adjust to new government
debt issues with some lag before reaching a new
equilibrium situation. We hope to avoid problems
ofthis nature by using annual data.
The ex-post real short-term interest rate is the
dependent variable in the regressions. Annual ex-
28post real interest rateswere calculatedfrom quarter-
ly average rates (compounded annually) which, in
tum, were calculated by subtracting the actual CPI
inflation rate overa quarter from the nominal inter-
est rate for that quarter. Short-term interest rates
wereemployed inall countriesto obtainaconsistent
andiriternatiollally comparable series of·market-
determined interest rates. 5
Our empirical analysis focuses on the influence
ofcentralgovernmentbudgetdeficit onreal interest
rates. However, generalgovernmentbudgetdeficits
(combining central and local governments) are em-
ployed in several instances to test the robustness of
the empirical results to the deficit measure choice.
Deficits are measured as a percent ofGNP to stan-
dardize the figures for international comparison.
(The central government budget deficit/gross sav-
ings ratio is also employed in several regressions.)
Complete data definitions are given in the data
appendix.
The results from estimating Equation (2) are pre-
sented in Table 1. This table also presents results
from several formulations of the basic equation to
provide some insight into the stability of the esti-
mated coefficients generally and, in particular, the
stability ofthe budget deficitcoefficient.
Coefficientestimates in the various formulations
ofthe model given in Columns (l)-(3) are,without
exception, statistically significant with the theoreti-
cally predicted signs. The nominal money growth
coefficient is not affected by the inclusion of the
cyclical variable, unemployment. The budget defi-
cit coefficient is larger, however, when unemploy-
ment is excluded from the model. The unemploy-
Table 2
Real Interest Rate Equations:
Real MoneyGrowth and Cyclical Money Growth;












































































































Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; OLS regressions
29ment coefficient is statistically significant and posi-
tive. This suggests that a cyclical downturn (proxied
by an increase in the unemployment rate and given
unchangedbudgetdeficits andmoney growth rates)
is associated, onaverage,with.a riseinreal interest
rates. 6
These results lend supporttothe commonly held
view thatlargebudgetdeficits(as apercentofGNP)
are one factor causing high real.short..term interest
rates. In particular, these estimates suggest that a
one-percentagepointincrease inthe budgetdeficit!
GNPratio over a one-yearperiod is associated with
an average real interest rate increase of between
40-100 basis points. Rl1pid nominal moneygrowth,
on the other hand, is associated with lower real
interest rates. Aone-percentl1ge point increase in
the annual rate ofnarrow money growth is associ-
ated with an average realinterest rate decline of
approximately 30 basispoint~.Thisresult parallels
those found earlier by Mishkin (1984)inastudy of
real interest rates in the Euro-deposit market using
quarterlydataoverthe· 1967-Hto 1979-Ilperiod.
Whencombinedwiththetrendsinbudgetdeficits
and.in nominal money·growth, these empirical re-
sults imply thatthe sharp increase inshort-term real




Deficits and the Central Government Deficit-






Constant .032 .012 -.021 .034 .016 .013
(2.37) (0.95) (-1.79) (3.09) (1.33) (-1.10)
General Government Budget Deficit .005 .001 .004
(2.31) (0.64) (1.75)
Central Government Deficit/Savings Ratio .002 .0007 .0009
(3.84) (1.37) (1.89)
Nominal Money Growth -.003 .003 .003 -.003
(-3.74) (-4.17) (-3.95) (-4.23)
Cyclical Money Growth -.002 -.001
(-2.09) (-1.95)
Unemployment .009 .009 .008 .008
(4.23) (4.07) (3.18) (3.05)
Dummy Variables:
U.K. -.039 -.066 -.081 -.042 -.063 .078
(-2.89) (-4.82) (-5.60) (-3.29) (-4.62) (-5.32)
France -.003 -.027 .032 -.006 -.024 -.034
(-0.23) (-1.99) (-2.22) (-0.50) (-1.85) (-2.37)
Japan -.023 -.009 -.021 .031 -.014 -.027
(-1.69) (-0.69) (-1.60) (-2.38) (-1.09) (-1.95)
Canada -.018 -.059 -.055 -.032 -.058 -.059
(-1.37) (-3.89) (-3.31) (-2.56) (-4.08) (-3.73)
Italy .049 -.056 107 -.057 -.059 -.101
(-2.05) (-2.65) (-5.54) (-2.93) (-3.28) (-5.97)
U.S. .022 -.059 -.052 -.037 -.059 -.058
(-1.59) (-3.98) (-3.17) (-3.03) (-4.43) (-3.91)
R2 .42 .56 .47 .49 .57 .47
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70
Standard Error .029 .026 .028 .027 .025 .028
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; OLS regressions
30partly attributable to slower money growth (120
basis points), but that the rise in federal budget
deficits overtllep¢riodprobablyplayeda largerrole
(100-250 basis points).
Experiments using alternative explanatory vari-
able definitiorisare reported in Tables 2 and 3. The
focus ofthese experiments is to determine the sensi-
tivity ofthe budgetcoefficient to alternative specifi-
cations. For the regressions reported in Table 2,
alternative money supply definitions, real money
growth (nominal money growth less actual infla-
tion) and a measure ofcyclical money growth (cur-
rent money growth less the weighted average of
money growth during the preceding three years)
were used. 7 In the macroeconomics literature, these
money growth variables are often offeredas alterna-
tives in real interest rate equations to the nominal
money growth variable. The use ofeither of these
alternative money supply variables increases the
magnitude and significance of the central govern-
ment budgetdeficitcoefficient as comparedto those
reported in Table I for nominal money growth. The
real money growth coefficients are statistically in-
significant and ofthe wrong sign, however.
Other experiments were conducted to address
questions about the appropriate budgetdeficit mea-
sure, for example, whether it should be limited to
the central government or should also include defi-
cits due to local governments and social security
funds. The first three columns ofTable 3 give the
results from substituting general government defi-
cits (central government plus local governments
and national social security funds) scaled by GNP
for the central government deficit variable used in
the previous regressions. Somewhat surprisingly,
the results for general government deficits in Table
3 are. similarto the results using the central govern-
ment budget deficit/GNP ratio presented in Table I
and Table 2. The coefficient fOf}hegeneralgov-
ernmentdeficit/GNP ratio is significant intwo of
thethree cases, and the effect ofthe deficit on real
interest rates is similar to that when only central
government budget deficits are used. However,
whenboth nominal money growth and unemploy-
ment are included in the estimation, the coefficient
fortlle general government budget deficit/GNP ratio
falls offin magnitude and significance.
Thescalingofbudgetdeficits by GNPratherthan
some other aggregate may also be questioned. Col-
umns (4)-(6) of Table 3 report on the use ofcentral
government budgetdeficits scaled by gross national
savings instead of GNP. This alternative deficit
variable measures the degree to which savings in an
economy are absorbed by central governmentdefi-
cits and might provide a better indicator ofthe
pressure exerted on real interest rates. 8 These results
also generally supportthe earlierfindings. The cen-
tral government deficit/gross savings coefficient has
the anticipated sign in each equation, but, again, it
is not significant in the equation that includes
unemployment.
In all ofthe experiments reported in Table 3, the
magnitudes and significance levels of the money
supply and unemployment variables are similar to
those reported in Tables I and 2. On balance, the
results in Table 3 suggest that there is significant
positive correlation between deficits and short-term
real interest rates regardless of how deficits are
measured.
III. Extensions
Apart from measurement issues, the simple em-
pirical tests we have reported may be criticized on
several levels. Onecriticism concerns the appropri-
ateness ofpooling the data, and thereby constrain-
ing the slope coefficients ofthe model to be equal
acrossthe sevencountries. A secondcriticismcould
question the homogeneity of the data across the
periodofestimation. Someeconomists have argued
that majorstructural changes in the world economy
have occurred since 1979, potentially changing the
linkages between budget deficits and real interest
rates. These potential objections to the methodology
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behind the estimates reported in Table I are dis-
cussed in tum below. 9
Pooling the Data
Pooling cross-section and time-series data impli-
citly assumes that all observations come from the
same.population regardless ofcountry. As a test of
the appropriateness ofthis assumption, we allowed
the coefficients ofthe fully constrained model, that
is, the model with a single intercept term (no coun-
try dummy variables), money growth variable and
central government deficit variable, to vary acrossNotes: I-statistics in parenthesis; OLS regressions
D is adummy variableandequalszero for the 1973-1979
period and unity for the 1980-1982 period.
Table4
Real.lnterest R.ate Equations:
Tests of Structural Change
Between1973·1979 and 1980-1982
confidence ofbetter than 90 percent (the F statistic
equals 2.05), that a structural shift did occur be-
tween the two sets of parameter coefficients esti-
mated<over the 1973-1979 (Column 1) and 1980-
1982(Column 2) periods. Somewhat surprisingly,
the correlation between money growth and real in-
terest rates becomes less significant in the latter
period. Incontrast, the positivecorrelationbetween
realinterest rates and budget deficits increases sub-
stantially; In addition, the structural change test for
the budget deficit coefficient alone during the latter
period (Column 3 in Table 4) suggests that it has
increased significantly, from .006 in 1973-1979 to
.01(.006 +.004) in 1980-1982. Hence, while the
evidence suggests that significant structural changes
Constant .026 .016 .026
(1.89) (0.85) (2.36)
Central Government .006 .013 .006
Bu(iget Deficit (2.77) (2.42) (2.94)
Money Growth -.002 .0006 -.002
(-2.15) (0.25) (-2.42)
Dummy Variables:
U.K. -.015 -.031 -.043
(-3.81) (-1.36) (-3.49)
France .054 .021 .009
(-1.08) (-0.73) (-.80)
Japan -.047 -.055 -.046
(-3.07) (-2.03) (-3.43)
Canada -.032 -.036 -.031
(-2.28) (-1.69) (-2.64)
Italy -.059 .137 .034
(-2.89) (-2.52) (-2.87)
U.S. -.041 -.029 -.034
(-2.94) (-1.31) (-2.87)
D* Central Government .004
Budget Deficit (2.24)
R2 .47 .49 .54
Observations 49 21 70







countries .. Denoting the model with no restrictions
across countries (intercept terms, money growth
slope coefficients and central government deficit
coefficientsareall allowedto vary across countries)
asthe "expanded model," the relevant F-statistic
measuring.thesignificance of the reduction in
squared errors between the expanded model and the
fully constrained model equals 1.43. The critical
lev~loftheF-statistic at the 5-percent level of
confidencefor the test is k92. This result suggests
thatpooling maybe appropriate, since the F-value
is substantially below the value needed to reject (at
th~5-percentlevel) the null hypothesis that all ob-
servationscomefrom the same population. Because
thistest is also unnecessarily strong, since our model
formulations in Table 1 also include unrestricted
countrY-specific intercept terms, one can be even
more confidentofthe result.
Tests for Structural Change
The international evidence reported here contrasts
markedly withnumerous domestic studies that sug-
gest very little association between budget deficits
and real interest rates. In fact, the lack of strong
empirical evidence supporting almost any reason-
able hypothesis attempting to explain the high levels
ofreal interest rates since 1979 have led some eco-
nomists to suggest that a major structural change
(presumably unquantifiable) has occurred in the
process generating real interest rates.
To shed some light on the issue, we split our
sample into two periods, 1973-1979 and 1980-1982,
and estimated the real interest rate equation for both
subperiods. The year 1980 is chosen as the breaking
point of the sample because of the rapid run-up in
real interest rates that began in that year, and be-
cause it is the first year following the October 1979
policy shift bythe Federal Reserve toward monetary
aggregate targeting. In another structural change
test, the budget deficit coefficient alone is allowed
to vary between the two sub-periods, while the
money growth and country intercept variables are
constrained tobe equal overthe full 1973-82 sample.
This allowed us to compare the significance ofthe
budget deficit-realinterest rate link in the two peri-
ods and, in particular, to test whetherthe significant
positive •association noted above has become
strongersince 1980.
The estimated equations are reported in Table 4.
The results ofaChow test suggests, with adegreeof
32haveoccurredinthe worldeconomy in recentyears,
it appears that the significant positive correlation
between budget deficits and real interest rates re-




are significantlycolTelatedwith large centralgov-
ernTent budgetdeficits.We look at international
datato explore this linkage. Specifically,we pool
annual observations over theiastdecadefor the
seven majorindustriaLcountries •and regress real
illterestrateS9IlceIlt:r;l1 governrnent deficits,holding
constant money growth, standardized unemploy-
mentratesandcountry-specificdummy variables.
The results generally support the hypothesis. We
find that a statistically significant positive relation
generally holds between real interest rates and def-
icits, irrespective of included variables, money
growth measures and deficit measures. Although
there are SOme. ~xceptions to this conclusion, the
positive deficit-realinterest rate correlationis suffi-
ciently stable in a variety ofmodel formulations to
give us confidence in the robustness ofthis empiri-
calresult.
Thepolicy implications from these results should
be drawn cautiously. Strictly speaking, the single
DATA APPENDIX
DataSources: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics (IFS); Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD-1), Occasional Stud·
ies, June, 1983; Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OEC;D-2); economicOutloqk, Decem-
ber1983.
1. Central anQ QeneralQovernment deficits as apercent of
GOP are from OECD-1.
2. Nominal mcmeygrowth rates are from IFS, line 34x.
3. CPiinflation rates are from IFS, line64x.
4. Domestic shortterminterestrates data are from:
France, call moneyrate, IFS line 60b
U.S., Treasury bill rate,lFS line 60c
Germany,p<:illmoneyrate,IFS line 60b
U.K.,Treasury bill.rate,lFsline60c
J<:ip<:in, callrnoneyrate,.IFS line 60b
Italy, callmoneYrate, IFSline60c
C<:inada,Tre<:islJrybill rate,lFSline60c
5. Unemploymentrates are fromOECf).2.
6. Countryspecific<dummy variables equal 1 for named
country,06therwise.
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equatioh tnethodology employed here qot}s notal-
low us to determine the causal linkage between
budgetdeficits and real interestrates. Nevertheless,
ourevidence is clearlyco~sistentWiththe hypothe-
sis that sizellble central~ovemment budget(ieficits
in the world's majoreconomies maybe. animpQrtant
factor holding up teal interestrates inrecentyearS.
The results of our.empirical analysis are •also
consistent with the hypothesis thattherecentslow-
down in monetarY growth may alsobearpartofthe
responsibility for current high real interest nlt~s.In
particular, the empirical results suggest that the
sharp increase in U.S. real interest rates between
1980-198:2 is partly attributable to slower money
growth (120 basis points), butthattheriseinfederal
budgetdeficits overthe same period likely played a
larger role 000-250 basis points). Moreover, in
light of the evidence gleaned from splitting the
sample into the pre- and post-1980 period, itap-
pears likely that large central government budget
deficits are playing an increasingly importantrole in
maintaining real interestrates attheirpresentle"els.FOOTNOTES
1. Simulations of the familiar MIT-Penn-SSRC economet-
ric model, for example, suggest a substantial increase in
short-term interest rates given a fiscal stimulus (see Fried-
man,. 1982). The Federal Reserve Board's mUlti-country
(MQfv1) modeLalso predicts a rise in interest rates in re-
SPOnse toa fiscal stimulus (see Haasand Symansky 1983).
Both of these models are large-scale structural models of
the economy.
2. Reduced form estimates ofadirectlinkbetween budget
<ieficitsand interestrateshave generally been unsuccess-
ful.Recent work has investigated various aspects of a
potentialreducedform linkage. Motley(1983) considers the
impactotseveral measures ofbudget deficits on real inter-
estr~tEll) andfinds little correlation. Hoelscher (1983), on
the other hand, investigates the impact of bUdget deficits
during the post-war period on nominal interest rates and
finds nO statistically significant relationship. Evans (1983)
takes a different perspective and investigates war-time
experiences, again failing to find the hypothesized deficit-
interest rate relation. One recent empirical study (Sinai and
Rathjens, 1983) purports to have found a significant link,
however, on interest rates arising from real government
deficits per capita in the U.S. Feldstein and Eckstein (1970),
in an earlierstudy, alsoestimated asignificanteffectforreal
per capita federal government debt on interest rates. Nev-
ertheless, a significant body of literature has failed to find
anysystematicsupportforastrongdeficit-interestrate link.
3. U.S. DepartmentofTreasury (1984).
4. Hoelscher (1983) derives this model and discusses its
relationship to the standard IS-LM model. This reduced
form equation is consistent with various theoretical frame-
works. The important point to note, however, is that this
model is a flow model rather than a stock model of interest
rate determination.
5. Mishkin (1984) discusses the assumptions implicit in
using theex-postreal interestrate as a proxyfortheexpect-
ed·(ex ante) real interest rate. Basically, this approach
assumes that markets are efficient, that is, all transactors
utilizeall available information in forming theirexpectations
about future inflation. The assumption that ex-post real
interest rates are good proxies for ex-ante expected real
interestrates is quitestrong, perhaps unnecessarilyso. For
example, however one proxies inflationary expectations,
the assumption that the inflationary expectations are ab-
sorbed in nominal interest rates on a one-for-one basis
places an additional constraint on the estimation. This con-
straint can be relaxed by re-arranging equation (2) to make
realized inflation the dependent variable and the nominal
interest rate an additional explanatory variable. This
change in the estimated equation resulted in modest in-
creases in the magnitudeand the significance ofthe budget
deficit coefficient. Specifically, the regressions reported in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 were re-run with realized infla-
tion asthedependentvariable and nominal interestrates as
an additional explanatory variable. Exceptfor the anticipat-
ed change in sign, the coefficientsfor moneygrowth and for
unemploymentare virtually unchanged in eithermagnitude
or statistical significance. Regressing realized inflation on
the nominal interest rate, the central government deficit,
nominal moneygrowth, and the country dummiesresults in
a coefficient (t-statistic) for the central government budget
34
deficit of ~0.010(-4.28) as compared with 0.008 (4.09) in
theoriginal formulation. With unemploymentincluded as an
l:lxp1anator)' variable, the comparison is -0.006(- 2.10) VS.
0.004(1.85).
6.Ul1Elrnploymentwasincluded in the estimation equation
toattempttocQntrolJactors associated with businesscycle
fluctuations. Unemployment, however, has a significant
risingtrend component. To address this.problem, we con-
structed a "CYClical" unemployment variable as the devia-
tiOnpfcurrentunemploymentfrom its pastweighted average
(three previousyears; weights equal to .5 for the first year
and.3and.2, respectively, for the second and third years)
and used this constructed variable intheequation in column
(3) ofTabll;ll .•Theresults ofthe regression provided strong
supportfor the hypothetical budgetdeficit/real interest rate
link; estimated coefficient values (t-statistics) equal .007
(3.12) for the central govemment budget deficit, - .003
(-3.89) for nominal rnoney growth and .004 (1.12) for the
constructed cyclical unemployment variable.
7. The weights on lagged money growth are .5 for the first
year, .3 for the second year and .2 for the third year.
8. Capio, et al (1983) discuss the problems involved with
using deficit-savings ratios as indicators of interest pres-
sure inboth theclosed and open economycontext. A major
criticism ofdeficit-savings ratios posed by the paper is that
deficit-savings ratios are not exogenous indicators and are
affected differently across countries given similar exoge-
nous Shocks to.governmentdeficits.
9. A third potential criticism is the question of simultaneity
in the estimationofthe real interest rate equations. Although
we do not suggest that the observed correlation between
budget deficits and real interest rates necessarily implies
causation, the empirical results maybeinterpreted thisway
by some. Critics of this latter view may therefore raise the
simultaneity issue. Specifically, it may be argued that an
increase in real interest rates depresses economic activity
which, in turn, causes government budget deficits to rise.
Thus, the budget deficit/real interest rate correlation may
bepicking upa reversecausation running from real rates to
budget deficits.
To .address this issue, we estimated equation (2) in the text
uS.ir)gsl;lyer~lins~(umental variables procedures. The in-
strumental variable estimates also suggest a positive bud-
get deficit/real interest rate association, but do so less
st(Qllgly thanttle>OLS results. In. Particular, the budget
deficit coefficient is statisticall¥ significant at the 10% level
when theunemployment variable is excluded, butdrops off
in significance when it is included in the instrumental vari-
able estimates; We are not satisfied with our instrumental
variable results and do notreportthem in the text because
we could notfind an appropriate exogenous instrument for
the budgetdeficitvariablefor each country.
In addition, itShouldbep()inted outthat a similar simultan-
eity argument is mostcommonly madeto explain why bud-
getdeficitsmaybenegativelyassociated with real interest
rates. Namely, an exogenousfall in real income may simul-
taneously cause both a fall in real interest rates and an
increase in governmentbudgetdeficits. Proponents of this
view therefore .a(gue that "structural" budget deficits (a
hypothetical estimate of the budget deficit based on a full-employmentoutputlevel in theeconomy)are positively
associated with reCiI interest rates,even thoughobserved
deficits may bEl.l1egativ~ly associated with re(jJinterest
rates. This commonly held view suggests that our esti-
mates of a positive correlatiol1 between unadjusted budget
deficits and real interest rates have a negative bias (for
example, should have astrongerpositivecorrelationthan is
reported),. rather than the positive bias discussed in this
text.
10.. This result is weakened, however, when.the nominal
money growth coefficient is allowed to.vary together with
the budget deficit coefficient during the latter period while
the other coefficient values are. constrained to be equal.
Nevertheless, in this .instance the evidence also suggests
that the influence of budget deficits on real rates ofinterest
has increased in recentyears.
35
REFERENCES
1. Gerald Capio, etal,"Deficit-Saving Rlitios As Indical:ors
ofInterest .Rate Pressure: A 9ollE!(:tion of Notes,"
Board OfGovernors of the Federal Reserve System,
lntern;itiollal F'inan~e.Dis~ussionPapers, No. 234,
December 1983.
2. George Demopoulos, et ai, "Central Bank Policy and
th~F'inancin9ofGovernment BudgetDeficits: A
Cross'-Country Comparison," Economic Papers of
theCommission ofthe European Communities No. 19,
September 1983.
3. Paul Evans, "Do Large.Deficits Produce High Interest
Rates?"· Unpublished Working Paper, Stanford Uni-
versity,October1983.
4. Martin S. Feldstein and OttoEckstein, "The Fundamen-
tal Determinants of the .ll1teresl Rate," Review of
Economics and Statistics, November 1970, pp.
363-375.
5. Benjamin M. Friedman, "Interest Rate Implications for
Fiscal and MonetaryPolicies:A Postscripton the Gov-
ernment Budget Deficit," Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, Vol. XIV, No.3., August 1982.
6. Richard A Haas and Steven A. Symansky, "Assessing
Dynamic Properties ofthe MCM: A Simulation Ap-
proach," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, International Finance Discussion Papers
No. 214, January 1983.
7. Gregory P. Hoelscher, "Federal Borrowing and Short-
Term Interest Rates," Southern Journal of Econom-
i~s, Vol. 50. No.2, October 1983, pp. 319-333..
8. Frederic S. Mishkin, ''The Real Interest Rate: A Multi-
Country Empirical Study," Forthcoming. The Canadian
JournalofEconomics (1984).
9. Brian Motley, "Real Interest Rates, Money and Govern-
ment Deficits," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
E~()nomic Re"iew, No.3, Summer 1983, pp. 3H5.
10. Robertw.R. Price and Jei:J,n-Claude Chouraqui,"Public
Sector Deficits: Problems and Policy Implications,"
OECD Economic·Outlook: Occasional Studies,
June 1983, pp. 13-44.
11. Allen Sinai and Peter Rathjens, "Deficits, Interest
Rates and the Economy," Data Resources U.S. Re-
view, June 1983, pp 1.27-1.41
12. U.S. Treasury Department, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Economic Policy, "The Effects ofDeficits
on Prices of Financial Assets: Theory and Evidence."
Monograph, January 1984.